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CHAPTER 9 
Evidence 
JOHN E. FENTON, JR.* 
§9.1. Sexually dangerous person: Sufficient evidence. Since its 
enactment in 1958, chapter 123A of the General Laws, the Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act, has been the subject of frequent challenges 
and much discussion. 1 This Survey year has been no exception. In 
Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 2 the Appeals Court held that evidence of only 
one incident of sexual misconduct that does not manifest compulsive 
behavior is not sufficient to warrant a finding that the defendant was 
a sexually dangerous person under the statutory definition. 3 
The proceedings under chapter 123A were begun after defendant 
was sentenced to M.C.I. Concord on October 27, 1970, having 
pleaded guilty to charges of assault to rape, an unnatural act, assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon, and furnishing liquor to a 
minor. On May 13, 1971, a petition for defendant's commitment to 
*JoHN E. FENTON. JR. is an Associate Judge, Massachusetts Land Court. The author 
wishes to acknowledge the research and writing help of Larry C. Kenna and Richard D. 
Brady, Research Assistants. 
§9.1. 1 See, e.g., Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1973) (double jeopardy); 
Peterson v. Gaughan, 404 F.2d 1375 (1st Cir. 1968) (vagueness and equal protection); 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 355 Mass. 479, 245 N.E.2d 429 (1969) (due process, double 
jeopardy, equal protection); Commonwealth v. McGruder, 348 Mass. 712, 205 N.E.2d 
726 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 972, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966) (right of 
confrontation); McGarry & Cotton, A Study in Civil Commitment: The Massachusetts 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 6 Harv. J. Leg. 263 (1969); Tenney, Sex, Sanity and 
Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1962); O'Reilly, Constitutional Law, 1968 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 7.2, at 190; Monaghan, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1965 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§§ 12.5, at 154, 12.9, at 163; O'Reilly, Constitutional Law, 1964 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 11.3, at 122; Fox, Criminal Law, Procedure and Administra-
tion, 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 11.2, at 113; Fox, Criminal Law, Procedure and 
Administration, 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 10.3, at 95. 
2 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 193, 307 N.E.2d 844. 
3 ld. at 196, 307 N.E.2d at 846. G.L. c. 123A, § 1 defines a sexually dangerous per-
son as: 
[a]ny person whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power 
to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive behavior 
and either violence, or aggression by an adult against a victim under the age of 
sixteen years, and who as a result is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on 
the objects of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires. 
1
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the treatment center at Bridgewater for the care, custody, treatment 
and rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons was filed by the dis-
trict attorney. At the hearing on the petition in superior court, two 
psychiatric experts testified for the Commonwealth that the defendant 
was a sexually dangerous person. A court-appointed psychiatric ex-
pert testified to the contrary. The defendant and his former wife tes-
tified on his behalf. The defendant's criminal record was also intro-
duced into evidence. The superior court found the defendant to be a 
sexually dangerous person and committed him to Bridgewater for 
from one day to life. 4 
The Appeals Court, in dismissing the petition, followed the case of 
Peterson, petitioner, 5 in which the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that the elements of proof required by the statutory definition of a 
sexually dangerous person include: ( 1) repetitive or compulsive be-
havior, (2) violence or aggression by an adult against a person under 
the age of sixteen, and (3) a likelihood that injury will be afflicted. 6 
Applying the statutory requirements and their interpretation in 
Peterson to the facts of the Jarvis case, the Appeals Court required 
concrete evidence of either repetitive and violent, or compulsive and 
violent, sexual misbehavior to sustain defendant's commitment as a 
sexually dangerous person. 7 Since defendant's criminal record pro-
duced no evidence of past sexual misconduct other than the one inci-
dent resulting in his present incarceration, and since the testimony of 
the psychiatric experts did not show that the incident manifested 
compulsive conduct, the court concluded that the evidence was not 
sufficient to authorize defendant's commitment as a sexually danger-
ous person. The court indicated that "a single act of sexual miscon-
duct may be so bizarre and irrational as to permit the inference by a 
trier of fact that it was uncontrollable, and thus provide the basis for a 
determination that it was compulsive behavior."8 However, the 
psychiatrists testifying at the commitment hearing apparently ex-
pressed no opinion as to whether the single incident which resulted in 
defendant's conviction for assault with intent to rape and perfor-
mance of an unnatural act was the result of compulsive behavior. 9 
The evidence in a proceeding for the commitment of a sexually 
dangerous person, whether it be expert psychiatric opinion testimony 
4 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 193, 307 N.E.2d at 845. 
5 354 Mass. II 0, 236 N .E.2d 82 (1968). 
6 Id. at 117, 236 N.E.2d at 86. 
7 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 196-97, 307 N.E.2d at 846-47. 
8 Id. at 197, 307 N.E.2d at 847. 
9 The court summarized the testimony of the psychiatrists and then observed: 
Perhaps the failure of the Commonwealth psychiatrists to concern themselves with 
the statutory requirements may have been the result of an erroneous view in this 
case by the staff of the treatment center that the statute does not require a finding 
of repetitive or compulsive conduct, but that these are merely relevant factors. 
ld. at 197 n.6, 307 N .E.2d at 84 7 n.6. 
2
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or prior conviction records, must satisfy the elements of proof as set 
out in chapter 123A, section 1.10 The statutory delineation of compul-
sive and violent or repetitive and violent behavior is not a mere eluci-
dation of relevant factors, but is a conclusive limitation on what find-
ings in fact will substantiate a determination of uncontrollable, and 
imminently dangerous, sexual misconduct. Such evidence is requisite 
to the constitutional validity of commitment based on a probable 
propensity to engage in criminal actions. 11 
§9.2. Privilege: Psychotherapist-patient. In Commonwealth v. 
Lamb, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Appeals Court's de-
termination that the psychotherapist-patient privilege created by chap-
ter 233, section 20B of the General Laws2 applies to any communica-
tions made by a patient to a court-appointed psychotherapist in the 
case of a court-ordered examination during commitment proceedings 
under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,3 absent a showing that the 
patient was informed that the communication would not be 
privileged. 4 Without such notice, any communications made during 
the court-ordered psychiatric examination would be inadmissible at 
the hearing on the petition for commitment as a sexually dangerous 
person. 
In accordance with section 6 of chapter 123A, the Sexually Danger-
ous Persons Act, 5 defendant Charles Lamb had been committed by 
order of the superior court to the treatment center for the care, cus-
tody, treatment and rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons for a 
sixty-day period of examination and diagnosis. 6 At the hearing on the 
petition for commitment for the indeterminate statutory period, 7 the 
10 G.L. c. 123A, §I. 
11 See Peterson, petitioner, 354 Mass. 110, 236 N.E.2d 82 (1968). See also Minnesota 
ex rei. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). 
§9.2. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 713, 311 N.E.2d 47, aff'g 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
635, 303 N.E.2d 122. 
2 G.L. c. 233, § 20B was inserted by Acts of 1968, c. 418. The statute provides in rel-
evant part: 
Except as hereinafter provided, in any court proceeding and in any proceeding 
preliminary thereto and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a patient 
shall have the privilege of refusing to disclose, and of preventing a witness from 
disclosing, any communication, wherever made, between said patient and a 
psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or 
emotional condition. 
See generally McLaughlin, Evidence, 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 18.1, at 431. 
3 G.L. c. 123A, § 6, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 838, § 58. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 718,311 N.E.2d at 51. 
5 G.L. c. 123A, § 6. 
6 The court order was pursuant to the procedures established under G.L. c. 123A, 
§ 4. 
7 The indeterminate period is one day to life. G.L. c. 123A, § 6. 
3
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psychiatrist who by order of the court had interviewed the defendant 
at the treatment center was permitted to testify over the objections of 
the defendant. The psychiatrist testified to the contents of certain 
police reports made available to him and to conversations with the de-
fendant while at the treatment center. Defendant had admitted dur-
ing the conversations that he had used alcohol and drugs, an admis-
sion the Appeals Court found to have contributed to the psychiatrist's 
diagnosis of the defendant as a sexually dangerous person. 8 The Ap-
peals Court sustained defendant's exceptions to the admission of 
prejudicial hearsay in the police reports,9 and to the denial of his 
right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 10 The Supreme 
Judicial Court sustained the latter exception after granting review lim-
ited to the applicability vel non of the psychotherapist privilege. 11 
Both parties had agreed that the admission fell within the protec-
tion of the section 20B privilege, but they disagreed as to whether one 
or more of the exceptions to the privilege applied. 12 Defendant Lamb 
argued that only exception (b) of section 20B, which provides that if a 
judge finds that the patient has been warned that the communications 
would not be privileged, the psychotherapist can testify as to com-
munications made to him in the course of a court-ordered psychiatric 
examination, applied. 13 No such notice was given to the defendant. 
The Commonwealth argued that both exception (a), which provides 
8 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 638, 303 N.E.2d at 124. At the commencement of 
the commitment proceedings, defendant was serving concurrent sentences of from five 
to seven years following convictions in I 968 of assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon and mayhem. ld. at 637 n.4, 303 N.E.2d at 124 n.4. The police reports indi-
cated that the crimes were convicted with gross sexual overtones, and stated that defen-
dant had stayed with a homosexual, had previously been placed on probation for three 
years for the abuse of a female child, and had also served a six-month sentence for 
fathering an illegitimate child. Id. at 637, 303 N.E.2d at 124. 
9 I 973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 637, 303 N.E.2d at 124, citing Commonwealth v. 
Bladsa, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1675, 288 N.E.2d 813. 
10 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 640, 303 N.E.2d at 126. 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 713,311 N.E.2d at 48. 
12 G.L. c. 233, § 20B provides, in pertinent part, that the privilege will not apply: 
(a) If a psychotherapist, in the course of his diagnosis or treatment of the pa-
tient, determines that the patient is in need of treatment in a hospital for mental 
or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by 
the patient against himself or another person, and on the basis of such determina-
tion discloses such communication either for the purpose of placing or retaining 
the patient in such hospital, provided however that the provisions of this section 
shall continue in effect after the patient is in said hospital, or placing the patient 
under arrest or under the supervision of law enforcement authorities. 
(b) If a judge finds that the patient, after having been informed that the com-
munications would not be privileged, has made communications to a 
psychotherapist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court, 
provided that such communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the 
patient's mental or emotional condition but not as a confession or admission of 
guilt. 
13 See G.L. c. 233, § 20B. 
4
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that the psychotherapist can disclose the communication in a hearing 
held to commit the patient to a hospital or retain him there if the 
psychotherapist concludes that the patient is in need of treatment or 
there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the patient 
against himself or others, and exception (b) were applicableY If both 
exceptions were applicable, no express waiver under (b) need be 
shown if the standards set forth by the legislature in subsection (a) 
were met. 15 
The Appeals Court held that exception (a) did not apply, reasoning 
that the statutory language "or placing the patient under arrest or 
under the supervision of law enforcement officers" in exception (a) 
did not reach a prisoner already under sentence and supervision, and 
that the treatment center was not a "hospital" within the meaning of 
the statute. 16 Since there was no evidence that the defendant had 
been warned that his communications would not be privileged, his ex-
ception to the admission of such communications was sustained. 17 
The Supreme Judicial Court, while passing over the question of 
whether the term "hospital" in exception (a) of section 20B included 
the treatment center, agreed with the Appeals Court that exception 
(a) was not applicable where the patient is already in the custody of 
state officials and where a judicially-supervised commitment proceed-
ing has commenced. 18 The Court construed the legislative intent, as 
shown by the language of exception (a), to deny the privilege only 
"when there is an imminent threat that a person who should be in 
custody will instead be at large."19 On the other hand, the policy of 
exception (b) was to permit expert psychiatric evidence through 
court-ordered examination only by affording the procedural 
safeguard of notice to the patient. The Court noted that in holding 
that exception (b) must govern exclusively under the circumstances of 
this case, i.e., where a court-appointed psychotherapist undertakes a 
court-ordered examination to determine whether a patient is a sexu-
ally dangerous person, it was carrying out the policy objectives of the 
statute while avoiding a construction of the statute that might infringe 
upon the defendant's rights of due process guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Lamb decision balances the need for full information upon 
which a court must make its decision with the need for procedural 
due process upon which the patient depends if he is to be treated 
fairly. The fact that the commitment proceeding under chapter 123A 
14 197 4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 715, 311 N .E.2d at 49-50. 
15 See note 8 supra. 
16 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 639-40, 303 N.E.2d at 125-26. 
17 Id. at 640, 303 N.E.2d at 126. 
18 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 716,311 N.E.2d at 50. 
19 ld. 
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is civil and not criminal, remedial and not pumt1ve, does not mean 
that the defendant is not entitled to the minimal standards of due 
process to be accorded the individual.2° The prospect of preventive 
detention via an indeterminate sentence of commitment to a treat-
ment center would appear to demand at least the minimum pro-
cedural safeguard of notice that the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
will be unavailable, especially where the individual is already in the 
custody of the state and the subject of a full judicial proceeding. The 
expert psychiatric evidence that may be critical to a court's determina-
tion under a chapter 123A commitment hearing will be available as 
long as the defendant-patient has been informed that his statements 
to the court-appointed psychiatrist will not be privileged. 
§9.3. Privilege: Clergyman-penitent. Although it is doubtful that 
any clergyman-penitent privilege existed at common law, 1 most states 
have enacted statutes protecting confessions made to a clergyman in 
his professional character or communications made to him in the 
course of his professional duties by a person seeking religious advice 
or comfort. 2 The Massachusetts legislature codified the clergyman-
penitent privilege in I 962 in section 20A of chapter 233 of the Gen-
eral Laws. 3 The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the scope of that 
statutory privilege during the Survey year in Commonwealth v. Zezima, 4 
and held that the "communication" made to a clergyman that was ac-
corded a testimonial privilege by the statute "is not limited to conver-
sation and includes other acts by which ideas may be transmitted from 
one person to another."5 
The defendant appealed from convictions of murder in the second 
20 See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799-801 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 355 Mass. 479, 245 N.E.2d 429 (1969). 
§9.3. 1 See 8 J. Wigmore, Communications Between Priest and Penitent, Evidence § 
2394, at 869 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 
161 (1818); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718 (1931). 
2 See 8 J. Wigmore, Communications Between Priest and Penitent, Evidence § 2395, 
at 873 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961, Supp. 1972); Reese, Confidential Communications 
to the Clergy, 24 Ohio St. L.J. 55 (1963). 
3 G.L. c. 233, § 20A, added by Acts of 1962, c. 372. See generally McDermott, Evi-
dence, 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.7, at 291. The statute provides: 
A priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed minister of any church or an accredited 
Christian Science practitioner shall not, without the consent of the person making 
the confession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional 
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the reli-
gious body to which he belongs; nor shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed 
minister of any church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner testify as to 
any communication made to him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual 
advice or comfort, or as to his advice given thereon in the course of his profes-
sional duties or in his professional character, without the consent of such person. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 683, 310 N.E.2d 590. 
5 Id. at 686, 310 N.E.2d at 592. 
6
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degree, assault with intent to murder, and unlawfully carrying a 
firearm on the ground that the admission into evidence of certain tes-
timony by a clergyman violated the clergyman-penitent privilege se-
cured by section 20A. The defendant had testified during the trial 
that he had never owned or possessed a gun. The prosecutor offered 
rebuttal evidence to impeach defendant's testimony that he had never 
possessed a gun. One of the rebuttal witnesses was a clergyman. After 
the clergyman had testified that he was acquainted with the defendant 
and was with him on a certain occasion in 1972, counsel for the de-
fense requested a voir dire concerning the Massachusetts clergyman-
penitent privilege. At the ensuing bench conference, the prosecutor 
informed the trial judge that the clergyman would be asked if he had 
seen a gun in the defendant's possession; the prosecutor also stipu-
lated that the purpose of the meeting in question between the clergy-
man and the defendant "was 'in accord with [section 20A].' "6 The 
voir dire was denied, however, and the trial judge instructed the 
clergyman to testify only as to what he observed and not as to any 
conversations or communications. The clergyman then testified that 
on a particular occasion about two months before the murder he saw 
a gun in defendant's possession. 
In construing the term "communication" in the clergyman-penitent 
privilege statute, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that this 
statutory privilege should be co-extensive with the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege, which has not been limited to conversations. 7 
The Court found particularly persuasive the juxtaposition of the term 
"conversations" in section 20 of chapter 233 (which provides testimo-
nial disqualification of a spouse as to "private conversations")8 with 
the term "communications" in section 20A, the next section of the 
chapter. The Court reasoned that since the term "conversations" has 
been construed to exclude written communications, 9 the use of the 
term "communications" in section 20A manifests an intent by the 
legislature "to include more than conversations in the privilege con-
cerning testimony of a clergyman."10 
After construing the statute, the Court held that the request for a 
voir dire should have been granted since defendant's act of displaying 
the gun to the clergyman could have been a privileged communica-
tion to him as part of a quest for religious or spiritual advice or 
comfort.U The factual determination of whether a communication 
6 Id. at 685, 310 N.E.2d at 591. 
7 Id. at 686, 310 N.E.2d at 592. See 8 J. Wigmore, Communications Between Attor-
ney and Client, Evidence § 2306, at 588 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Vigoda v. Barton, 
348 Mass. 478, 204 N.E.2d 441 (1965); Klefbeck v. Dous, 302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 308 
(1939). 
8 G.L. c. 233, § 20. 
9 Commonwealth v. Caponi, 155 Mass. 534, 30 N.E. 82 (1892). 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 686,310 N.E.2d at 592. 
11 Id. at 686-87, 310 N.E.2d at 592. 
7
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privileged under section 20A did occur must be made by the trial 
judge, aided by the clergyman's statements concerning the circum-
stances surrounding the communication. However, the Court did not 
reverse the defendant's convictions since the clergyman's testimony 
was only cumulative to the testimony of other rebuttal witnesses and 
thus its admission was not prejudicial. 12 
§9.4. Privilege: Government-informer. Although the privilege of 
the government to prevent disclosure of the identity of informers who 
have provided information concerning violations of law has long been 
recognized as an aid to law enforcement, 1 this privilege is subject to 
two important qualifications. 2 The Supreme Judicial Court recognized 
the first exception in 1928 in Commonwealth v. Congdon,3 stating that 
the government-informer privilege "does not apply when the in-
former is known or when the communication has been divulged."4 
This Survey year presented, in Commonwealth v. Ennis, 5 the first occa-
sion for a Massachusetts appellate court to rule on the other generally 
recognized exception to the privilege: when evidence of the identity 
of the informer becomes important to the establishment of the de-
fense in a criminal prosecution. 6 In Ennis, the Appeals Court held 
that the privilege does not apply where the informer was the only 
other witness present at the allegedly illegal transaction between the 
defendant and a police officer and the fundamental issue was whether 
the officer or the defendant and his alibi-witnesses were telling the 
truth. 7 
Ennis had been convicted of selling marijuana. A police officer tes-
12 Id. at 687,310 N.E.2d at 592. 
§9.4. 1 In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872), the Supreme Judicial Court 
determined that such "secrets of state" were privileged to the extent that the govern-
ment so desired. Id. at 488. It was in the absolute discretion of the government, and 
not the courts, to decide when the public interest called for disclosure. See also Pihl v. 
Morris, 319 Mass. 577, 66 N.E.2d 804 (1946); Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 
166, 165 N.E. 467 (1928). 
2 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957); 8]. Wigmore, State Secrets 
and Official Documents, Evidence§ 2374, at 761 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Annot., 
76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961). 
3 265 Mass. 166, 165 N.E. 467 (1928). 
4 Id. at 175, 165 N.E. at 470. 
5 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 595, 301 N.E.2d 589. 
6 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). The Appeals Court in 
Ennis noted "that 'the trial court may compel disclosure if it appears necessary in order to 
avoid the risk of false testimony or in order to secure useful testimony. For example, 
disclosure will be compelled if the informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt.' " 
1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 597, 301 N.E.2d at 590, quoting 8]. Wigmore, State 
Secrets and Official Documents, Evidence § 2374, at 768 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
The court noted that this exception has been characterized as reflecting "fundamental 
requirements of fairness," citing Roviaro, supra, at 60-61, and as being "essential to as-
sure a fair determination of the issues," citing Am. Law Inst., Model Code of Evidence, 
Rule 230. 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 597, 301 N.E.2d at 590. 
7 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 598, 301 N.E.2d at 591. 
8
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tified for the Commonwealth that he had purchased the marijuana 
from the defendant while in the company of the informer, who had 
previously arranged the sale. The defendant denied that the sale had 
taken place and offered an alibi which was corroborated by the 
defendant's father and a friend. When the police officer was called to 
testify by the defense, the trial court sustained the prosecution's objec-
tion to disclosure of the name and address of the informer on the 
basis of privilege. 
In finding that an exception to the privilege was necessary under 
these facts, the Appeals Court distinguished the rule that the identity 
of an informer need not be disclosed where the issue is the suppres-
sion of illegally obtained evidence on the ground that a motion to 
suppress is usually collateral to the main issue of guilt or innocence.8 
The court rejected the distinction offered by the prosecution between 
an informer who participates in the crime and one who is merely a 
witness on the ground that disclosure of the informer's identity in 
either situation would be important for a fair determination of the 
case. 9 The court also rejected the prosecution's contention that the 
failure to recognize the exception was not prejudicial because the ef-
fect of disclosure could only be conjecture. 10 
While acknowledging the validity of limitations on the government-
informer privilege, the Appeals Court nevertheless limited its recogni-
tion of the exception to the specific facts of Ennis. The court did, 
however, set forth standards which should be followed in future in-
cursions into the government-informer privilege: the informer's tes-
timony must be crucial to the accused's defense; the main purpose for 
which disclosure is sought must relate to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, i.e., trial of the criminal charge itself; and the informer's 
identity must be important to a fair determination of the caseY When 
these standards are met a Massachusetts court should order disclosure 
of the informer's identity. Although the purpose of the government-
informer privilege is the promotion and protection of the public in-
terest in effective law enforcement, the limitations on this privilege 
8 ld. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 599, 301 N.E.2d at 592. The court referred to Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 
Mass. 505, 209 N .E.2d 308 (1965), in which a similar right to interview a witness was 
denied to the defendant. ld. at 515-18, 209 N.E.2d at 314-16. The court noted that de-
fense counsel may have elicited contradictions and inconsistencies in the informer's tes-
timony, or even an exculpatory statement. 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 599-600, 
301 N.E.2d at 592. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the Supreme Court 
reversed a narcotics conviction for refusal to require disclosure of an informer's iden-
tity, pointing out that the informer might have testified to an entrapment, cast doubt 
on the identity of the accused or the package, testified as to the accused's lack of know-
ledge of the contents, or contradicted the government's version of an important conver-
sation. Id. at 63-64. 
11 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 597-99, 301 N.E.2d at 590-91. 
9
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acknowledged in Ennis are equally necessary to the promotion of jus-
tice. The Appeals Court has now established that in Massachusetts the 
availability of evidence necessary to a determination of one's inno-
cence must be the predominant concern when in conflict with the 
preservation of an informer's anonymity. 12 
§9.5. Privilege of a criminal defendant not to offer any evidence 
at a preliminary hearing or lower court trial. In Commonwealth v. 
Morrison, 1 an appeal from a conviction of armed robbery, the Appeals 
Court rejected a narrow construction of section 23 of chapter 278 of 
the General Laws, which provides: 
At the trial of a criminal case in the superior court, upon indict-
ment or appeal, the fact that the defendant did not testify at the 
preliminary hearing or trial in the lower court, or that at such 
hearing or trial he waived examination or did not offer any evi-
dence in his own defence, shall not be used as evidence against 
him, nor be referred to or commented upon by the prosecuting 
officer. 2 
The prosecution's cross-examination of defendant's witnesses at the 
trial produced testimony from each witness that at the probable cause 
hearing on the same matter which was held before a judge the witness 
had not testified and had not told the judge about certain matters tes-
tified to at the superior court trial. 3 Although the alleged violation of 
section 23 was not properly. before the Appeals Court because 
defendant's objection was not timely made, the court nevertheless ad-
dressed the issue to clarify it for retrial. 4 In dictum, the court refuted 
the contentions of the Commonwealth that section 23 (1) proscribes 
only disclosure of the fact that defendant himself did not testify in his 
own behalf, and (2) should not prohibit the prosecution from im-
peaching witnesses for the defense by disclosing that the witnesses 
were present at defendant's preliminary hearing but did not testify al-
though evidence was taken at the hearing which the witnesses pre-
sumably could contradict.5 
The plain language of section 23 denies the prosecution, inter alia, 
the right to show that the defendant at the preliminary hearing or 
lower court trial "did not offer any evidence in his own defence."6 
12 See 8 J. Wigmore, State Secrets and Official Documents, Evidence § 2374, at 761 
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
§9.5. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 749, 305 N.E.2d 518. 
2 G.L. c. 278, § 23. 
3 Id. at 752, 305 N.E.2d at 520. 
4 Id. at 753 n.3, 305 N.E.2d at 521 n.3. The Commonwealth had argued that the line 
of questioning was proper and thus the issue was likely to arise again at retrial. Id. at 
753, 305 N.E.2d at 521. 
5 Id. at 753-54, 305 N.E.2d at 521. 
6 G.L. c. 278, § 23. See text at note 2 supra. 
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The logical application of these words refers to all the evidence pre-
sented on defendant's behalf and not merely to his own personal tes-
timony. Thus, the statute also precludes disclosure of the fact that the 
defendant waived examination of any witness. Section 23 protects the 
de novo rights of the Massachusetts criminal defendant by prohibiting 
disclosure at the trial in superior court by the prosecution of evidence 
presented or omitted by defendant at any prior hearing. Therefore, 
the method of impeachment attempted by the prosecution in Morrison 
violated section 23 of chapter 278. 
The Appeals Court by its statement of views in Morrison has effec-
tively precluded circumvention of the mandate of section 23. The 
prosecution may not be conducted in any way that would allow the 
jury in a superior court trial to infer what section 23 was intended to 
remove entirely from its consideration. 
§9.6. Sixth Amendment right of confrontation: Admissible hear-
say and the Bruton rule. In a joint trial, limiting instructions to the 
jury are not a sufficient substitute for the defendant's constitutional 
right of cross-examination so as to permit the admission in evidence 
of the confessions or admissions of a codefendant who does not take 
the stand when the confessions or admissions implicate the defendant. 
The United States Supreme Court held in 1968 in Bruton v. United 
States 1 that the admission in evidence of such confessions or admis-
sions violates the defendant's rights secured by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment2 because of the substantial risk that 
the jury might consider the incriminating extrajudicial statements in 
determining the defendant's guilt, despite instructions to the 
contrary. 3 
In Bruton, admissions made by a codefendant that incriminated the 
defendant Bruton in their joint trial for armed postal robbery were 
introduced through the testimony of a postal inspector who had inter-
rogated the codefendant. The trial court gave strict instructions to the 
jury that the confession was admissible against the codefendant but 
was inadmissible hearsay with respect to Bruton and should not be 
considered in determining Bruton's guilt. Both defendants were con-
victed. The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction. 4 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 5 the Su-
preme Judicial Court, on an appeal from the denial of a motion for a 
§9.6. I 391 U.s. 123 ( 1968). 
2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation was held applicable to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965). 
3 391 U.S. at 126. For a discussion of the Bruton decision, see Note, The Supreme 
Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 95, 231-38 (1968); Kramer, Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 15.10, at 395. 
4 391 U.S. at 137. 
5 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1351, 303 N.E.2d 338. 
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new trial, faced the question of whether the defendant's rights under 
the rule established in Bruton were violated. Although the Court had 
affirmed McLaughlin's conviction in 1967,6 the United States Su-
preme Court had ruled in 1968 that Bruton applied retroactively7 and 
it was on the basis of this ruling that the motion for a new trial was 
made.8 Defendant McLaughlin had been found guilty of murder in 
the first degree in a joint trial; three codefendants had been found 
guilty of being accessories after the fact. Three witnesses called by the 
Commonwealth at the joint trial had testified that on the evening the 
murder took place, immediately after they heard a loud noise, they 
saw one of the codefendants run into the apartment where they were 
and heard her make a statement to the effect that the defendant had 
shot someone. The first witness to so testify described the codefen-
dant as shaken up and nervous and heard her say " 'George [the 
defendant] shot someone.' "9 Defendant's counsel objected to the tes-
timony of the first witness on the ground that the defendant was not 
present when the statement was made and asked for an instruction 
that it was not admissible against the defendant. The trial judge re-
fused the limiting instruction, saying " '[t]his is all part of the res 
gestae.' "10 After the second witness testified to the same statement, 
describing the codefendant as hysterical, counsel for McLaughlin re-
quested that it be struck as to the defendant. The trial judge, how-
ever, allowed it de bene and the defendant excepted. When the third 
witness was asked to testify about the same statement by the codefen-
dant, both the prosecutqr and defendant's counsel asked that the tes-
timony be admitted only against the codefendant. The judge so in-
structed the jury. Moreover, during his charge to the jury, the judge 
limited the admissibility of the testimony about the statement to the 
codefendant only as an admission by her.U 
In analyzing the defendant's contention that his constitutional rights 
under the Bruton rule were abridged, the Supreme Judicial Court 
pointed out that the rule "does not purport to hold that a defendant's 
right of cross-examination ... is violated whenever hearsay evidence is 
6 Commonwealth v. McLaughlin. 352 Mass. 218, 224 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 916 (1967). 
7 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). The Bruton rule was applied retroactively in 
Kiley v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 800, 263 N.E.2d 463 (1970); Commonwealth v. 
McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969). 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1351-52, 303 N.E.2d at 341. 
9 Id. at 1354, 303 N.E.2d at 342. 
10 Id. at 1355, 303 N.E.2d at 342. 
11 In charging the jury, the judge called attention to the evidence of the statement by 
the codefendant and said "'I admitted it only against [her] and it can be considered 
only in the indictment against her. ... The other defendants were not present when ... 
[she] made that statement.'" Id. at 1356 n.1, 303 N.E.2d at 343 n.l. The Court noted 
that these instructions were substantially similar to the limiting instructions held con-
stitutionally inadequat~ in Bruton. Id. at 1358, 303 N.E.2d at 344. 
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admitted against him and he is not able to cross-examine the person 
to whom the hearsay statement is attributed."12 The Court, after 
examining the language of Bruton 13 and subsequent cases involving 
claimed violations of the Bruton rule,14 found that two questions were 
involved: (1) whether the codefendant's statement would have been 
admissible against the defendant as an exception to the hearsay rule if 
the indictments against him had been tried separately, and (2) 
whether the statement was properly admitted against him in the joint 
trial when offered through the testimony of the three witnesses. 15 
Since the codefendant's statement would have been admissible in a 
separate trial of the defendant under the spontaneous utterance ex-
ception to the hearsay rule,16 the Court concluded that there was no 
violation of the Bruton rule or defendant's constitutional rights. 17 
The Court's interpretation of the Bruton rule in McLaughlin im-
plicitly recognizes that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay evi-
dence rules are coextensive in their protection of the criminal defen-
dant. According to Dean Wigmore, "[t]he right to subject opposing 
testimony to cross-examination is the right to have the Hearsay rule 
enforced; for the Hearsay rule is the rule requiring cross-examination 
•••• " 18 The hearsay rule rejects assertions offered for the truth of 
what is stated therein "which have not been in some way subjected to 
the test of Cross-examination."19 Exceptions to the hearsay rule have 
been recognized when the statements offered are considered 
12 Id. at 1359, 303 N.E.2d at 345. 
13 The Supreme Court had stated in a footnote: 
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inad-
missible against him under traditional rules of evidence, ... the problem arising 
only because the statement was (but for the violation of [Miranda v. Ariwna, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), and Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)]) admissible 
against the declarant [codefendant] .... There is not before us, therefore, any rec-
ognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we in-
timate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
391 U.S. at 128 n.3. 
14 United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 
(1971); McGregor v. United States, 422 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1970); Kay v. United States, 
421 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1970); Campbell v. United States, 415 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1969); 
Migliore v. United States, 409 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Zentgraf, 310 
F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Howell v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill. 
1969); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 275 N.E.2d 33. 
15 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1357, 303 N.E.2d at 344. 
16 The Court referred to the test of admissibility as formulated in Rocco v. Boston-
Leader, Inc., 340 Mass. 195, 196-97, 163 N.E.2d 157, 158-59 (1960). 1973 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1362-63, 303 N.E.2d at 347. 
17 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1365, 303 N.E.2d at 347-48. 
18 5 J. Wigmore, The Hearsay Rule Satisfied By Confrontation, Evidence § 1397(2), 
at 130 (3d ed. 1940). 
19 Id. § 1362, at 3 (emphasis deleted). 
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trustworthy. 20 It is only when there is a question concerning the accu-
racy of the assertion by the witness that the right of cross-examination 
remains indispensable. Thus, if the statement comes under an hearsay 
exception, it already has been judicially determined to be admissible 
into evidence for whatever value it is worth. What is necessary, there-
fore, as noted by the Court in McLaughlin, is that the judge first de-
termine whether the statement properly falls into one of the admissi-
ble hearsay categories. Once facts sufficient to make this ruling have 
been established, the evidence may come in as admissible hearsay 
without any violation of the Bruton rule. 
§9. 7. Expert opinion testimony: Piercing the "general accep-
tance" smokescreen. In Commonwealth v. Devlin,! the Supreme Judi-
cial Court considered, inter alia, whether the superior court had com-
mitted error in admitting into evidence the expert opinion testimony 
of a radiologist who identified a homicide victim based upon a com-
parison of the X-rays previously taken of a particular individual with 
the X-rays of the victim's remains. 
Defendant Devlin appealed from a conviction of manslaughter of 
John James Rooney, Jr. The body of the victim was not susceptible to 
the normal procedures for identification because of mutilation. 2 To 
establish the corpus delicti of its case, the Commonwealth had offered 
expert opinion evidence in the form of testimony by Dr. John Leland 
Sosman, an experienced radiologist and specialist in the comparative 
analysis of X-rays of bones and joints. 3 Dr. Sosman testified that, 
2° For a discussion. of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, see id. §§ 1420 et. seq., at 
202 et. seq. 
§9.7. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353. 
2 The human remains had been discovered in Patton's Cove, Dorchester, on June 9, 
1971. The traditional means of identification of human remains-fingerprints, dental 
X-rays or personal identification-were of no avail since the victim's hands and head 
were missing and the body was significantly decomposed. The Associate Medical Ex-
aminer for Suffolk County had X-rays taken of the remains (the post-mortem X-rays). 
After a check of local hospitals based upon a general determination that the deceased 
was a male ranging in age from the late teens to about forty, it was discovered that one 
John James Rooney, Jr. was believed to have been killed on March 17, 1971, and that 
X-rays had been taken of Rooney's spine (September 1970) and right shoulder (March 
9, 1971) (the ante-mortem X-rays). ld. at 584, 310 N.E.2d at 354-55. 
3 The Commonwealth had attempted to play down the significance of Dr. Sosman's 
testimony since it only tended to establish the corpus delicti. Brief for Commonwealth at 
46, Commonwealth v. Devlin, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353. "[T]he full 
import of Dr. Sosman's testimony, if believed, was that John Rooney was dead." Id. 
However, as both the defendant and the Court pointed out, this element was vital to 
the proof of the Commonwealth's case against Devlin since the death certificate stating 
that the torso was Rooney's and the associate medical examiner's statement that he 
based his conclusion on Dr. Sosman's opinion would have been inadmissible. Therefore, 
the testimony of Dr. Sosman was not to be considered as merely going to a collateral 
issue. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 585 n.2, 310 N.E.2d at 355 n.2; Brief for Defendant at 
32, Commonwealth v. Devlin, supra. 
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based upon his experience, knowledge, and reading on this subject, 
no two adult humans have identical bone structures.4 He further tes-
tified that, based upon his examination of the X-rays of the remains 
of the victim taken in June 1971 and X-rays taken of John James 
Rooney, Jr. in September 1970 and March 1971 before his 
disappearance,5 the two sets of X-rays were of the same person. This 
testimony was admitted over defendant's objection. 
The defendant argued on appeal that the admission of the expert 
opinion testimony of Dr. Sosman constituted prejudicial error on two 
grounds: ( 1) Dr. Sosman lacked the necessary qualifications to justify 
admission of his testimony that the bone configuration of every adult 
is unique, 6 and (2) the Commonwealth failed to establish that Dr. 
Sosman's opinions had received "a general acceptance by the com-
munity of scientists involved" required for the admission of scientific 
evidence. 7 
The Court, applying the standard of abuse of discretion or error of 
law for reversal on appeai,B held that no error had been committed in 
exposing the jury to Dr. Sosman's testimony. 9 The Court pointed out 
the large number of X-ray comparisons that Dr. Sosman had made 
4 At the trial, Dr. Sosman was asked whether "any two human beings have the exact 
same bone configuration," whereupon he replied: "[N]ot as far as I know. In all my ex-
perience I have never seen two-and in other work that's been published on this. The 
bone structure is said to be unique even in identical twins." Brief for Robert Michael 
Wilson at 27, Commonwealth v. Devlin, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353, 
quoting 3 Transcript of Trial in Superior Court, 293-94. Dr. Sosman testified that he 
had used X-rays in other situations to identify unknown human remains but that he 
had never before testified in a criminal case as to the identification of unknown re-
mains, and, as far as he knew, no one else ever had. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 587, 310 
N.E.2d at 356. 
5 See note 2 supra. 
6 The essence of this argument was that (a) Dr. Sosman may have been an expert in 
some matters, but not in the area about which he was called to testify; and (b) the rec-
ord was devoid of any indication that Dr. Sosman had ever made any spinal compari-
sons prior to this case. See Brief for Defendant at 28, 29, 32, Commonwealth v. Devlin, 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353. As for the necessity that a witness testify 
only regarding that area in which he has some particular expertise, see Commonwealth 
v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 71 N .E.2d 411 (194 7) (specialist in surgery held qualified to 
express opinion regarding gunshot wound which did not penetrate victim's clothing, 
even though defendant objected on grounds that expert not qualified since he had 
never seen wound from bullet that had not passed through·clothing). 
7 Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963) (poly-
graph results inadmissible since both techniques employed in administration of tests 
and premises upon which theory rests not supported by substantial authority establish-
ing scientific reliability). Polygraph test results may now be admitted where certain con-
ditions are met. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 
313 N.E.2d 120, discussed in §9.10 infra. 
8 See Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 71 N.E.2d 411 (1947); Common-
wealth v. Capalbo, 308 Mass. 376, 32 N.E.2d 225 (1941). 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 585, 310 N.E.2d at 355. 
15
Fenton: Chapter 9: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
§9.7 EVIDENCE 177 
during his career, a "double blind study" that tested his ability to 
match X-rays of the same person, and the procedure followed in the 
case at hand. 10 The Court concluded that Dr. Sosman's education, 
training, and experience more than met the minimum necessary qual-
ifications to permit his expert opinion testimony.U In regard to 
defendant's second contention, the Court concluded that Devlin did 
not involve an unproven or disputed scientific instrument or product 
of scientific theory. 12 Although Devlin presented the first instance of 
admitting testimony relating to the "comparative X-ray identification" 
technique in a criminal trial, 13 the Court characterized the testimony 
as a "medical opinion" that was "the product of years of experience 
viewing tens of thousands of X-rays."14 Thus, the Commonwealth was 
not required to show "a general acceptance by the community of sci-
entists involved," a precondition to the admissibility of an opinion 
based on the results of a scientific instrument or theory. 15 
The question of the admissibility of "comparative X-ray analysis 
identification" testimony was again presented in Commonwealth v. 
Gilbert. 16 In Gilbert, the defendant was convicted of murder in the sec-
ond degree of his wife, whose remains were discovered in a plastic 
bag in the ocean approximately nine months after her death. 17 Dr. 
Sosman again testified as to the identity of the remains on the basis of 
comparative X-ray analysis and gave his opinion that every individual 
is unique in his or her bone structure. The defendant argued on ap-
peal that Dr. Sosman's testimony should not have been admitted be-
cause its premise had not yet received "general acceptance." The Su-
10 ld. at 586-87, 310 N.E.2d at 356. In the "double blind study," "[o]ne hundred ten 
X-rays of the chest had been given Dr. Sosman as if they were of known persons. One 
hundred ten other chest X-rays, unmarked and treated as unknown, had also been 
given to him. Only 100 X-rays in each group were of a person whose X-ray was in the 
other group." Id. at 587 n.4, 310 N.E.2d at 356 n.4. 
11 I d. at 586, 310 N .E.2d at 356. 
12 As the Court stated, "[c)ertainly the use and reading of X-rays and the comparison 
of X-rays is a generally recognized medical practice." Id. at 588, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
13 Id. at 587, 310 N.E.2d at 356. See note 4 supra. 
14 Id. at 588, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
15 See note 7 supra. The Court in Fatalo followed Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923), the first case involving the admissibility of the results of a "lie-
detector" examination. Frye distinguished scientific evidence from other expert tes-
timony and set out the test for admissibility: "While courts will go a long way in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, 
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular .fzeld in which it belongs." 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). See 
generally Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah 
L. Rev. 313 (1964); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 
1970 U. Ill. L.F. 1. 
16 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1185, 314 N.E.2d 111. 
17 The remains consisted of two feet, two lower legs, a mid-portion of the trunk from 
the thoracic vertebra to the fourth lumbar vertebra, with several ribs still attached, and 
decomposed tissue. Id. at 1190,314 N.E.2d at 115. 
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· preme Judicial Court rejected this argument on the basis of its hold-
ing in Devlin, stating that "we gave approval [in Devlin] to this mode 
of identification when applied by a qualified expert."18 The Court also 
held proper the admission of testimony by an expert in physical an-
thropology which corroborated Dr. Sosman's conclusion, despite the 
defendant's objection that the testimony was hearsay, because the cor-
roborating "testimony was worthwhile cumulative evidence on the re-
liability of a novel scientific identification technique, and, as such, was 
properly admitted."19 
For over fifty years the smokescreen of "general acceptance" (some-
times referred to as "scientific reliability")20 has obstructed the search 
for probative evidence in the science and science-related fields. 21 The 
"general acceptance" test has been criticized for its narrow approach 
to the admissibility of practically any information grounded in scien-
tific principles.22 The Supreme Judicial Court in Devlin and Gilbert has 
18 Id. at 1191, 314 N.E.2d at 115. Gilbert injected the further element of corrobora-
tive testimony by an expert in physical anthropology. Dr. Wilton M. Krogman, a profes-
sor of anatomy with a Ph.D in physical anthropology, had compared the X-rays of the 
remains with those of the supposed victim and verified on a random basis the conclu-
sions of Dr. Sosman. This evidence was admitted over defendant's objections that it 
constituted hearsay. Id. 
19 Id. 
20 E.g., Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963) (polygraph 
tests properly excluded due to controversy in scientific circles); Commonwealth v. 
D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959) (reliability of blood tests to prove non-
paternity an established scientific fact); Commonwealth v. Stappen, 336 Mass. 174, 143 
N .E.2d 221 ( 1957) (substantial authority supports scientific reliability of blood grouping 
tests to prove biologically the impossibility of paternity). 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 
(1970) (neutron activation analysis had gained general acceptance); McClard v. United 
States, 386 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1967) (analysis of boot prints admissible); Lewis v. United 
States, 382 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (handwriting analysis admissible); Goodall v. 
United States, 180 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 987 (1950) (ballistics test 
admissible); Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 
873 (1946) (spectroscopy had gained general acceptance); United States v. Ridling, 350 
F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (mem.) (polygraph results admissible under certain con-
ditions); United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972) (voiceprint 
analysis); People v. Davidson, 5 Misc. 2d 699, 152 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Monroe County Ct. 
1956) (drunkometer). 
22 See, e.g., Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 
Utah L. Rev. 313 (1964); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence, 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 1. Boyce states that: 
It is time that the Frye doctrine was rejected and scientific evidence received 
where otherwise material or relevant. ... [T]he Frye rule is, to the extent that it is 
based upon wide recognition and acceptance, impracticable. Scientific advancement 
is occurring at an ever-increasing rate. Theoretical knowledge of a reliable nature 
is, in some areas, currently moving swiftly ahead of application .... It is, therefore, 
appropriate for courts to adopt a more realistic approach to the use of scientific 
evidence in criminal cases. 
Id. at 327. 
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permitted the admission of expert opinion testimony on a "novel sci-
entific identification technique,"23 comparative X-ray analysis, without 
requiring proof of "general acceptance by the community of scientists 
involved." 
The Court's opinion in Devlin, indirectly reaffirmed in Gilbert, may 
have placed the aging and infirm platitude of "general acceptance" in 
its proper perspective. 24 The policy reasons for requiring the "general 
acceptance" standard for scientific evidence as established in 
Commonwealth v. Fatalo 25 was that "a trial could descend into a battle of 
experts on the probative value of the polygraph test rather than a de-
termination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The end result, 
in all likelihood, would be confusion instead of enlightenment."26 
These policy reasons did not apply in Devlin,27 and the Court reaf-
firmed in Gilbert the probative value of "comparative X-ray analysis 
identification" evidence. 
23 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1190,314 N.E.2d at 115. Despite the Court's characteriza-
tion of the X-ray comparison technique as "novel" in Gilbert, it has been utilized for 
some time by criminologists, although the instances are admittedly rare. See Kade, 
Meyers & Wahlke, Identification of Skeletonized Remains by X-Ray Comparison, 58 J. 
Crim. L.C. & P.S. 261 (1967). 
24 In United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 
(1970), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the "general acceptance" 
standard as a basis for denying admission of testimony regarding "neutron activation 
analysis." The court admitted the testimony based upon two propositions, both of which 
could arguably apply to Devlin: (I) after the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, 
decides that the state of technology in a given field renders opinion testimony admissi-
ble, disputes over technique employed by the witness go to the quality of the evidence (a 
traditional jury consideration); and (2) "neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty 
in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every useful new development must 
have its first day in court." I d. at 438. 
25 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 4 79 ( 1963). See note 7 supra. 
26 346 Mass. at 269, 191 N.E.2d at 481. 
27 The Supreme Judicial Court was faced with an impressive array of factors which 
considered together argue conclusively for the admissibility of the opinion testimony: 
first, the testimony, though crucial, did not in fact tend to implicate Devlin on the issue 
of guilt or innocence; second, there was other testimony to the effect that the skin sam-
ples from the remains indicated that the deceased had a tattoo on his left arm and 
Rooney was shown to have had a tattoo on that arm; third, though the defense had 
ample time to seek out and introduce conflicting testimony or evidence, they failed to 
do so; fourth, Dr. Sosman's testimony as to his findings and technique were explained 
to the jury through the use of a model of the human vertebrae, enlargements of 
X-rays, and the superimposition of one slide over another to show that the bones in 
question were identical; and fifth, the superior court judge had delivered an excellent 
limiting instruction which focused the jury's attention on the purpose of and weight to 
be given to the expert opinion. Brief for the Commonwealth at 37, 38, 46, Common-
wealth v. Devlin, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353. Additionally, at the trial it 
was pointed out that police scientists use this method of identification without hesitation 
when traditional means fail, and that X-ray identification has been used in many civil 
cases, e.g., will contests and insurance claim suits after large-scale catastrophes. ld. at 
35, 43. 
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§9.8. Witnesses' statements: Necessity for hearing of voluntari-
ness by trial judge. After the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed his 
conviction for manslaughter in 1972 in Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 1 
Peter LaFrance brought a petition for habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in LaFrance v. 
Bohlinger, 2 alleging denial of his right of confrontation and right to 
due process. This petition presented an evidentiary question of first 
impression in Massachusetts. 
Both LaFrance and one Brown had been involved in a hit and run 
death in 1971. Within a few days of the incident, police officers suc-
ceeded in obtaining a statement from Brown which clearly inculpated 
LaFrance. At LaFrance's trial, however, Brown testified that he and 
LaFrance had spent the entire night in question at a friend's apart-
ment. With the court's permission, and over the objections of the de-
fense, the prosecution used Brown's prior inconsistent statement to 
the police as a source of leading questions upon direct examination. 
While admitting that he had signed the statement, Brown explained 
the inconsistency by revealing that his prior account to the police had 
not been rendered voluntarily. 3 Nevertheless, the typed statement was 
allowed into evidence ostensibly to impeach Brown's testimony at trial 
which tended to exculpate LaFrance. The trial judge instructed the 
jury that the impeachment evidence should be considered in weighing 
Brown's credibility but not as evidence of LaFrance's guilt. In his peti-
tion to the federal district court, LaFrance claimed the admission of 
Brown's out-of-court statement, the truth of which was denied at trial, 
deprived him of his right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him and violated his right to due process since the trial judge failed to 
make a preliminary determination of the voluntariness of the state-
ment. 
The district court directed that a writ of habeas corpus issue on the 
ground that LaFrance's right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been violated. 4 The court dismissed LaFrance's con-
frontation argument since Brown, the out-of-court declarant, was 
§9.8. 1 1972 Mass Adv. Sh. 177, 278 N .E.2d 394. The defendant was also convicted 
of leaving the scene of an accident after causing personal injury, operating a motor ve-
hicle without a license and so as to endanger. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 365 F. Supp. 198, 
199-200 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 29 (lst Cir. 1974). 
2 365 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d (lst Cir. 1974). 
3 The elements of Brown's testimony which tended to support this explanation were 
that threats were made to him by a certain officer at various times during his interroga-
tion; Brown claimed he was suffering withdrawal from the use of drugs at the time of 
the interrogation; numerous promises and suggestions were alleged to have been made 
by the police in return for and in solicitation of favorable responses from Brown; 
Brown had endured about seven hours of questioning before "breaking down;" and, 
throughout his witness-stand testimony, Brown emphatically denied the truth of his 
prior statement. 365 F. Supp. at 202, 207. 
4 I d. at 200-01. 
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available at trial for full and effective cross-examination. 5 The court 
then discussed LaFrance's due process argument. Citing Jackson v. 
Denno, 6 in which the Supreme Court approved the Massachusetts pro-
cedure of requiring a preliminary determination by the trial judge of 
the voluntariness of a defendant's confession/ Judge Tauro reasoned 
that it would be "illogical" to permit the coerced statement of a wit-
ness to serve substantially the same function denied to the coerced 
statement of a defendant. 8 Such statements fail the traditional tes-
timonial benchmarks of trustworthiness and reliability and, in addi-
tion, their use in any manner9 is offensive to the concepts of "fair play" 
and a "fair trial."10 The court thus held that the trial judge was man-
dated to undertake an independent determination as to the voluntari-
ness of a witness's prior statement before it could be heard by the 
jury. Furthermore, the court concluded that the trial judge must in-
struct the jury to consider the question of voluntariness of the state-
ment before considering it for impeachment purposes. 11 
The Commonwealth appealed the federal district court's decision, 12 
claiming that it engendered an unwarranted extension of the Jackson 
confession rule13 to allegedly coerced prior statements of a witness. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's 
insistence upon a prior evidentiary hearing-out of the jury's 
presence-on the question of voluntariness, but found no constitu-
tional requirement for further submission of this issue to the jury. 14 
The First Circuit interpreted Jackson as forbidding the use of an in-
voluntary confession not only because of its unreliability but also due 
5 Id. at 205. In Bruton v. United States, 39I U.S. 123 (1968), and Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), cited by petitioner in support of his confrontation ar-
gument, the witness whose prior statement was at issue could not be cross-examined at 
trial. 
6 378 u.s. 368 (1964). 
7 Id. at 378-79. 
8 365 F. Supp. at 205. 
9 "The fact that Brown's statement was admitted for impeachment purposes only, and 
not as substantive evidence, ... does not permit a different conclusion." 365 F. Supp. at 
207. 
10 Id. at 205-06. In combining a consideration of traditional standards (trustworthi-
ness, reliability) with new concepts (fair play, due process right to fair trial), the court 
was merely following the trend of recent cases in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wolfe, 307 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1962) (dicta); People v. Underwood, 61 Cal. 
2d 113, 124, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313,319, 389 P.2d 937,943 (1964); People v. Newman, 30 
Ill. 2d 419, 197 N.E.2d 12 (1964); People v. Tate, 30 Ill. 2d 400, 197 N.E.2d 26 (1964). 
Cf. Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972). 
See also Comment, The Right of a Criminal Defendant to Object to the Use of Tes-
timony Coerced From a Witness, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 549 (1962); Note, 58 Geo. L.J. 621 
(1970). 
" 365 F. Supp. at 207. 
12 LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974). 
13 See text at note 5 supra. 
14 499 F.2d at 32. 
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to its fundamental unfairness. 15 Although the same rationale was not 
completely analogous to impeaching statements of witnesses, 16 the ex-
clusionary rule should be applied in LaFrance "because there is a sub-
stantial claim by the defendant that the impeaching statement offered 
by the government was obtained by police threats and other blatant 
forms of physical duress. Where such a claim is made and supported 
by sworn testimony, the court has a duty to conduct its own inquiry 
and to exclude the statement if found to have been unconstitutionally 
coerced."17 Although the district court had reversed LaFrance's con-
viction and ordered him released, 18 the First Circuit remanded the 
case to the district court for a hearing on the issue of coercion.19 
The Commonwealth is now faced with the opportunity to improve 
upon the touted "Massachusetts procedure" approved in Jackson v. 
Denno.20 The evolution of evidentiary considerations with regard to 
any and all coerced utterances-whether from the accused or from a 
third person-has stretched the bounds of traditional standards21 to 
the bursting point. If the Massachusetts courts recognize, as did both 
federal courts in LaFrance, that preventing the "sacrifice of important 
human values"22 is the paramount exclusionary consideration, an ir-
resistible strain will be placed upon the tolerance of those boqnds. 
§9.9. Polygraph results: Admissibility. The posture of the Su-
preme Judicial Court regarding the admissibility of polygraph test re-
sults in criminal trials underwent a startling and abrupt about-face 
during the Survey year. In February 1974, in Commonwealth v. 
15 ld. at 34. 
16 The Court of Appeals distinguished impeaching statements of witnesses from con-
fessions on the following grounds: (I) an impeaching statement is not substantive evi-
dence of guilt; (2) exclusion of involuntary impeaching statements is not a principle 
rooted in the common law; (3) there is no absolute parallel between affirmative evi-
dence and impeaching statements; (4) there is absent the accused's dilemma of remain-
ing silent or taking the stand and exposing himself to cross-examination and impeach-
ment; (5) extension of exclusionary rules tends to further complicate trials; and (6) 
there is the problem of third-party standing. Id. at 33-34. 
17 ld. at 35. 
18 A new trial was no longer inevitable since the question of voluntariness did not 
have to be submitted to the jury. I d. at 36. 
19 Id. 
211 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Pursuant to this procedure (with regard to confessions), the 
jury passes on the voluntariness of statements only after the trial judge has fully and 
independently resolved that issue against the accused. The jury is then called upon to 
consider the allegations of coercion andmay disregard the judge's prior determination if 
it feels this action warranted by the facts. 378 U.S. at 378 n.8. One problem with this 
procedure is that there is no "feedback," i.e., no way of knowing how much or how lit-
tle weight the prior determination of voluntariness had on the jury's decision. In addi-
tion, allowing the jury in effect to reconsider the voluntariness allegations may simply 
confuse them and complicate their crucial deliberations on guilt or innocence. 
21 That is, the trustworthiness and reliability of the assertions contained in an out of 
court statement. 
22 499 F.2d at 32. 
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Corcione, 1 the Court stated that "lie detector evidence is incompetent 
in Massachusetts."2 Despite the defendant's failure to object in that 
case when a witness was questioned as to the defendant's polygraph 
test results, the Court indicated that "the better course" would have 
been for the trial judge to exclude such testimony. 3 The Corcione hold-
ing was founded upon the feared prejudicial effect that the mere 
mention of polygraph results might have on a jury's reasoning. 4 
Four months after the Corcione decision, in Commonwealth v. A 
juvenile (No. 1),5 the Court noted that "substantial advances [had] 
been made in the field of polygraphy since [its admissibility was last 
ruled on by the Supreme Judicial Court)."6 In A juvenile the Court 
held, over the strong dissent of three justices, 7 that polygraph test re-
sults are admissible if a defendant had agreed in advance to their ad-
mission regardless of their outcome.8 The Court directed trial judges 
to preface the admission of polygraph results with "a close and search-
ing inquiry" into the examiner's qualifications, 9 the defendant's fitness 
for the examination, the test methods used, as well as assurance that 
the defendant's constitutional rights are fully protected. 10 The Court 
expressly declined to overrule Commonwealth v. Fatalo 11 and permit 
polygraph test results to be generally admissible in evidence in crimi-
nal trials. Instead, the Court delineated four situations in which 
polygraph results would be admissible within the discretion of the trial 
judge: 
(1) where the defendant moves that he be allowed to submit to an 
examination conducted by an examiner of his own choosing; (2) 
where the defendant moves that he be allowed to submit to an 
examination administered by an expert chosen by the Common-
wealth; (3) where the defendant moves to be allowed to submit to 
an examination conducted by a jointly selected examiner, or by 
examiners designated by the defendant and by the Common-
§9.9. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 151,307 N.E.2d 321. 
2 Id. at 160, 307 N.E.2d at 327. 
3 Id. at 161, 307 N.E.2d at 327. 
4 Id. at 160-61, 307 N.E.2d at 327. See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191 
N.E.2d 479 (1963). 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 313 N.E.2d 120. 
6 Id. at 908, 313 N.E.2d at 122. 
7 Justices Quirico, Reardon and Kaplan dissented, in opm1ons written by Justice 
Quirico, id. at 926, 313 N.E.2d at 132, and Justice Kaplan, id. at 937, 313 N.E.2d at 
138. All three joined in each dissenting opinion. 
8 Id. at 910-11, 313 N.E.2d at 124. 
9 Id. at 910, 313 N.E.2d at 124. The Court did not, however, provide a minimum 
standard that must be met by a polygraph examiner before labeling him qualified. Id. 
at 933, 313 N.E.2d at 136 (dissenting opinion). 
10 Id. at 910-11,313 N.E.2d at 124. 
11 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963). 
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wealth; or (4) where the defendant moves that the court appoint 
an examiner. 12 
One can only speculate as to the ramifications, in this and in other 
jurisdictions, of the decision in Commonwealth v. A juvenile. Justice 
Quirico's dissent does not, in all probability, even begin to scratch the 
surface of the problems trial judges will now face when a defendant 
moves (or fails to move) to introduce polygraph test results. 13 Two 
fundamental concerns pervade the probative value/prejudicial effect 
dilemma surrounding polygraph results: (1) Can the theoretical and 
mechanical underpinning of polygraphy be sufficiently established so 
as to achieve predictable consistency? (2) What precisely is the poten-
tial effect on jury deliberations of admitting lie detector test results? 
These two concerns are as yet unanswered, as is evident from the 
Court's decision. At any rate, whether the Court's "working out of its 
own destiny" justifies the holding of Commonwealth v. A juvenile now 
rests with the trial judge's discretion and the process of trial and 
error. 
§9.10. Legislation. The General Court, by enacting chapter 964 
of the Acts of 1973, brought Massachusetts into line with the great 
majority of jurisdictions which prohibit impeaching a witness by in-
troducing evidence of the witness's disbelief in the existence of God. 
Chapter 964 amended chapter 233, section 19 of the General Laws, 
which had permitted evidence of a witness's disbelief in the existence 
of God to be received on the issue of credibility. 1 Section 19 had long 
been considered unusual and controversial, and had been utilized in 
few cases. This long-overdue abolition of a method of attempted im-
peachment recognizes the legal inconsequence of a lack of religious 
belief on the credibility issue. 
One of the exceptions to the patient-psychotherapist privilege, 
codified as section 20B(e) of chapter 233 of the General Laws, was 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 915-16, 313 N.E.2d at 126. 
13 Justice Quirico noted several problems inherent in the majority opinion: (I) a fail-
ure to consider that private biases and impressions formed by an examiner about his 
subject's guilt or innocence before the test could influence question formulation and 
test structuring, and thus, results; (2) ignoring the probable conclusive effect on the 
trial process, despite lingering doubts about the test's accuracy, due to the "almost im-
penetrable aura of scientific infallibility" which surrounds the lie detector machine in 
the minds of jurors; (3) the shortcomings of cross-examination of the expert as a 
safeguard since no minimum or uniform standards were established for qualification of 
examiners; and (4) certain "procedural and substantive legal questions," such as the 
permissibility of retesting by the Commonwealth after a defendant chooses his own ex-
pert pursuant to "option one," problems with defendant's waiver of the right to refrain 
from self-incrimination, and difficulties associated with a defendant's failure to offer 
evidence of polygraph test results. See id. at 926-37, 313 N.E.2d at 132-38 (Quirico, J., 
dissenting). 
§9.1 0. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 964, amending G.L. c. 233, § 19. 
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modified by chapter 240 of the Acts of 1974.2 In child custody cases 
where the mental fitness of either parent to care for the child was at 
issue, the prior exception provided that certain conditions had to be 
satisfied before a psychotherapist could testify as to the fitness of his 
patient: the issue of mental competence had to be raised by one of the 
parties, and the psychotherapist had to believe that disclosure of in-
formation regarding competence was necessary to protect the child. 
Section 20B(e) was amended to allow the judge, at an in-chambers 
hearing, to make the determination that a psychotherapist has evi-
dence bearing significantly upon his patient's ability to care for the 
child. 3 Should the judge further determine in consideration of the 
child's welfare that disclosure of this evidence outweighs the necessity 
for upholding the psychotherapist-patient privilege, an exception to 
the privilege is now recognized and relevant testimony by the 
psychotherapist is mandated. This exception places the crucial deter-
mination of admissibility in the proper hands, i.e., those of a neutral 
arbiter whose function is to maximize protection of the child. 
Massachusetts' time limitations for allowing the introduction of 
proof of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, chapter 233, 
section 21 of the General Laws, has always contained an exception if 
the witness had subsequently been convicted of a "crime" within the 
time limitation. 4 Case law had interpreted a "crime" to be any 
crime-felony or misdemeanor.5 This exception emasculated the ef-
fectiveness of the General Court's effort to keep evidence of certain 
convictions from the trier of fact since even a relatively minor traffic 
violation sufficed as a crime. Chapter 502 of the Acts of 197 4 creates 
a fourth exception to section 21 which may serve to alleviate the prob-
lem. Records of conviction for traffic violations upon which a fine only 
was imposed may not be shown for impeachment purposes, and may 
not be introduced to "open the floodgates" to have records of other 
ancient convictions made admissible unless the witness has been con-
victed of another crime (presumably even another traffic violation 
upon which a fine only was imposed) within five years of the witness's 
testifying. 6 
Acts of 1974, chapter 598 amends chapter 152 of the General Laws 
by adding section 20B, which provides a hearsay exception to the in-
2 Acts of 1974, c. 240, amending G.L. c. 233, § 20B. 
3 G.L. c. 233, § 20B(e), as amended. 
4 "First, The record of his conviction of a misdemeanor shall not be shown for such 
purpose after five years from the date on which sentence on said convictions was im-
posed, unless he has subsequently been convicted of a crime within five years of the time of his 
testifying .... " G.L. c. 233, § 21 (emphasis added). 
5 See, e.g., Quigley v. Turner, 150 Mass. 108, 22 N.E. 586 (1889); Commonwealth v. 
Ford, 146 Mass. 131, 15 N.E. 153 (1888). 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 502, amending G.L. c. 233, § 21. 
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troduction of medical reports of incapacitated, disabled or deceased 
physicians in proceedings before the Industrial Accident Board.7 It is 
interesting to note that this expansive exception does not apply in full 
force to tort actions for personal injuries or death in a court of law, 
where, as provided in chapter 233, section 79H of the General Laws, 
only the report or expression of opinion of a deceased physician may, 
at the discretion of the trial judge, be admissible in evidence. 8 De-
pending on the Board's construction of the terms "incapacitated" and 
"disabled," allowing for this broad exception to the hearsay rule in 
administrative proceedings may present significant conflict with the 
Board's duty to afford due process to injured workers seeking relief 
before it. 9 However, the Administrative Procedure Act10 clearly pro-
vides for judicial review of Board decisions and imposes the require-
ment of findings based upon "substantial evidence" upon the adminis-
trative body, 11 thus, perhaps, mitigating any possible abuses under the 
new statute. 12 
7 Acts of 1974, c. 598, adding G.L. c. 152, § 20B. 
8 G.L. c. 233, § 79H. 
9 See Haley's Case, 356 Mass. 678, 255 N .E.2d 322 (1970) (Constitutional due process 
requirements apply to board hearings and decisions in workmen's compensation cases). 
10 G.L. c. 30A. 
11 G.L. c. 30A, § l4(8)(e). See Healey, Administrative Law, 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law § 11.6, at 338. 
12 Any finding based exclusively upon evidence which would be inadmissible hearsay is 
not deemed to be supported by substantial evidence, even in an administrative tribunal. 
Sinclair v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 331 Mass. 101, 117 N.E.2d 164 (1954), citing 
Moran v. School Comm., 317 Mass. 591, 59 N.E.2d 279 (1945), and other cases. 
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